FM 3.39-40

This follows up on my previous post.  Here again is the link to Army Field Manual 3.39-40: http://info.publicintelligence.net/USArmy-InternmentResettlement.pdf

Field manual (FM) 3-39.40 is aligned with FM 3-39, the
military police keystone FM. FM 3-39.40 provides guidance for commanders and staffs on internment and
resettlement (I/R) operations. This manual addresses I/R operations across the spectrum of conflict, specifically
the doctrinal paradigm shift from traditional enemy prisoner of war
(EPW) operations to the broader and more inclusive requirements of detainee
operations. 8

Additionally, FM 3-39.40 discusses the critical issue
of detainee rehabilitation. It describes the doctrinal foundation, principles, and processes that military
police and other elements will employ when dealing with I/R populations. As part of internment, these populations
include U.S. military prisoners, and multiple categories of detainees (civilian internees [CIs], retained
personnel [RP], and enemy combatants), while resettlement operations are focused on multiple categories of
dislocated civilians (DCs).

So far, so good.  This a  further fleshing out of an existing manual governing the processes which military police follow.  You will note, though, that it is already a bit fuzzy on the difference between internment and resettlement.  I/R is used as a unit throughout the text, even though one would think prisoners and people being “helped” would be treated in quite different ways.


Still you get the feeling that since this is dealing, say, with Iraq, or Afghanistan, or some as-yet-unbegun future conflict overseas, all this is quite reasonable.

The skills necessary for performing confinement
operations for U.S. military prisoners in permanent facilities are directly
transferable and adaptable for tactical confinement of U.S. military prisoners
and detention of detainees.

This includes capabilities to conduct shaping
operations across the spectrum of military operations to mitigate and defeat
the underlying conditions for conflict and counter the core motivations that
result in support to criminal, terrorist, insurgent, and other destabilizing
groups. I/R operations also include the daily incarceration of U.S. military
prisoners at facilities throughout the world.

 MP’s already know how to arrest and confine people.  Why not deploy them to get all the people out of the way between the shooters on both sides, as well as, of course, the people on the other side doing the shooting?

A CI is a
civilian who is interned during armed conflict, occupation, or other military
operation for security reasons, for protection, or because he or she committed
an offense against the detaining power. CIs, unless they have committed acts
for which they are considered unlawful combatants, generally qualify for
protected status accordingto the GC,
which also establishes procedures that must be observed when depriving such
civilians of their liberty. CIs are to be
accommodated separately from EPWs and persons deprived of liberty for any other
reason. Page 17

So people who have DONE NOTHING WRONG can still be forcibly confined.

 1-1 Interment operations focus on all types of detainees and U.S.
Military prisoners.  Although a part of
internment procedures, we use the term confinement rather than internment when
referring to U.S. military prisoners. 

So they admit there is no difference between “internment” and “confinement” other than the word used, and the outer legal pretext.

1-2 Internment and resettlement operations are conducted by military
police to shelter, sustain, guard, protect, and account for populations
(detainees, U.S. Military prisoners, or dislocated civilians) as a result of
military or civil conflict, natural or man-made disaster, or facilitate
criminal prosecution.  Internment
involves the detainment of a group or population that pose some level of threat
to U.S. military operations. Resettlement involves the quartering of a
population or group for their own protection. 
These operations inherently control the movement and activities of their
specific populations for reasons of security, safety, or intelligence
gathering.  I/R operations require detailed
advance planning to provide a safe and secure environment.  U.S. policies dictate that in addition to
U.S. military prisoners, all individuals captured, interned, evacuated, or held
by U.S. armed policy [sic: this may be a later addition, as the sentence is
fragmented between pages] applies from the moment they are under control of U.S
Armed forces until they are released, repatriated, or resettled. 14

Now we see that “resettlement” involves the “control [of] movement and activities” for “their own protection.”  That doesn’t sound benign, but surely we are still talking about activities in foreign nations, say Somalia, or Sudan, right?

An I/R battalion is typically organized to support, safeguard,
account for, guard, and provide humane treatment for up to 4,000 EPWs/CIs, 8,000
DCs, or 1,500 U.S. military prisoners; however, certain missions may require
additional resources and manning (for example, long-term counterinsurgency
internment). 32

These places are intended to be big.

The handling of DCs is also a mission that may be
performed in support of disaster relief or other emergencies within the United
States or U.S. territories during civil support operations. As such, local,
state and federal agencies are primarily responsible for handling DCs with the U.S.
military in a support role. When a state of emergency is declared, the state’s
national guard may be  called to assist
with DCs under the control of the state governor or they may be federalized and
conduct operations as federal U.S. military forces. 33

Now, alarm bells should be going off.  Given his choice, is Obama going to place “his” Army units under State control, or “federalize” the national guard?  Further, this is not tacit admission, but OVERT admission that all these rules regarding at least “resettlement” can be applied on US soil to US citizens.

 I/R operations in support of stability operations may become enduring
and assume many of the characteristics of large-scale, maximum security prison
operations that are typically found in the international civilian sector.
Long-term custody and control requirements are often augmented with structured
rehabilitative and reconciliation programs, increased access to medical
treatment, and visitation opportunities concluding with some form of guarantor
or sponsor-based release or supervised system. These operations are
resource-intensive and should receive a priority commensurate with their
strategic significance. 33

“Resettlement” can turn into long term incarceration, with release contingent on complying with “structured rehabilitative and reconciliation programs”, which they will sweeten by finally letting you see a dentist to treat your cavities, give you your glasses back so you can see, let people see you to know you are alive, and finally release you if and only if someone on the outside agrees to come back to jail with you if you misbehave.  These reeducation programs are very important, and perhaps constitutive of the intent of the entire project, and should be well funded, and supplied with lots of support personnel.

The maintenance and development of large-scale facilities
is a continuous sustainment effort and often involves contractors, HN
personnel, or third country nationals. The synchronization of sustainment,
security, and operational requirements and efforts necessary to operate a
detention or resettlement facility are complex tasks that require sufficient
authority to achieve the unity of effort and security. 33

These things don’t come into being overnight, so we’d best get cracking.  Note that this was written in 2010, at which point the war in Iraq was largely over, and that we have never faced a general uprising in Afghanistan of the sort that led to massive civilian dislocations, meaning that these plans were either useless when created, or intended for something else.

The military police I/R support to stability
operations is central to transitioning the strategic risk of interning large
numbers of combatants and civilian detainees to a strategic advantage gained
from the reintegration of informed and productive citizens at peace with their
community and government. Military police may be tasked with detaining,
interning, and confining enemy combatants, members of the armed forces, or
civilians anywhere along the spectrum of conflict. Although military police
formations have been typically organized and staffed for conducting detainee
operations in high-intensity conflict, the reality is that military operations
at the general war end of the spectrum of conflict are commonly of short duration
compared to operations conducted at levels of violence less than general war,
such as insurgency or unstable peace.

Basically, their plan is to brainwash internees into being “informed and productive citizens at peace with their community and government.”  No shorter summary of the purpose of Communist reeducation camps could be formulated, and the inherent duplicity also mimics their style.


Further, until the Army declares “stable” peace, anybody “anywhere along the spectrum of conflict” is liable to be arrested.

During stability, the nature of the threat can often
inhibit the ability of friendly forces to differentiate between a hostile act
and hostile intent or between insurgents and innocents within the civilian
community. For this reason, military commanders and forces must have the
authority to detain civilians and an acceptable framework to confine, intern,
and eventually release them back into the OE. This authority has the most
legitimacy when sanctioned by international mandate or when it is bestowed or
conveyed from the local or regional governmental power. The initial or baseline
authority granted to military forces to use force and detain civilians will
ultimately determine the status of the persons they detain. The status of detainees
will further determine the manner in which they are processed, the degree of
due process they are afforded, and whether their offense is military or
criminal in nature. Detainee status and identification will also help develop
and determine eventual rehabilitative, reconciliatory, and release strategies.
34

Again, when you are thinking that this applies to Islamists, it sort of makes sense.  But ultimately what they are saying is that anything goes. They can arrest anyone they want if “legitimacy” is bestowed or conveyed from the local or regional governmental power.


And I want to underscore that at no point have they developed a functional differentiation between the rules of engagement in foreign nations and US soil.  All they need is a declaration of martial law, and ALL OF THIS applies here, as they have stated more or less openly.

During conflict with a conventional force, the
segregation of officers, enlisted personnel, civilians, and females is required
when conducting internment operations and is relatively clear in its application.
In contrast, due to the unconventional nature of the enemy, stability
operations may be more likely to require segregation (or typology) by ethnic,
tribal, or religious affiliation; human behaviors, traits, and characteristics;
age groups; and other categories, to include those typically applied in combat
operations. The facts and circumstances resulting in an apprehension may also
determine detainee custody and control status. The goal is to isolate
insurgents, criminals, and extremists from moderate and circumstantial detainees.
Inaccurate assessments can have immediate and significant effects within the
TIF that can result in injury or death to detainees; contribute to insurgent
recruitment; or cause custody and control problems for the guard force. 34

Here, again, they explicitly state that an aim is to separate “extremists” from “moderate and circumstantial detainees.”  When applied to Islamists, sure.  But where is the line drawn?  In principle, they have put on paper a policy designed to allow them to separate out people based upon virtually ANY CRITERIA THEY CHOOSE.  There is NOTHING in the US legal system which allows this, and much that specifically disallows it, like the Equal Protection Clause.

Civil support is the DOD support to U.S. civil
authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and
other activities. (JP 3-28) Civil support includes operations that address the
consequences of natural or man-made disasters, accidents, terrorist attacks and
incidents in the U.S. and its territories.

 2-40. The I/R tasks performed in support of civil
support operations are similar to those during combat operations, but the
techniques and procedures are modified based on the special OE associated with operating
within U.S. territory and according to the categories of individuals (primarily
DCs) to be housed in I/R facilities. During long-term I/R operations, state and
federal agencies will operate within and around I/R facilities within the scope
of their capabilities and identified role. Military police commanders must closely
coordinate and synchronize their efforts with them especially in cases where
civil authority and capabilities have broken down or been destroyed.

“The I/R tasks performed in support of civil support operations are similar to those during combat operations”.  Put another way, “let us reinforce the foundational assumption of this paper that all the tactics and policies which purport to deal with other nations can be equally applied here in the United States.”

Within the military police structure, attached units
that participate in I/R operations are under the command of the senior military police officer present
at each echelon. 38

I am not overly familiar with the command structure of the US military, other than to state the obvious point that the command structure in US OPERATIONS of the scale contemplated is completely untested.  What this seems to be saying, though, is that 1) where I/R (again, note the failure to differentiate the two) is concerned, the top dog is going to be a Military Police officer; and 2) logically, Obama has likely seeded the military police structure either with ideological fellow travelers or people who were open to being bought for the limitless sums of money he likely has at his disposal.

DCs are kept separate from detainees and U.S. military
prisoners. DCs are controlled to prevent interference with military operations
and to protect them from combat. DCs may also require assistance during natural
or man-made disasters and subsequent humanitarian-assistance missions. The
Department of Homeland Security, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, and
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, along with their respective support staffs,
are involved in resettlement operations to support and protect DCs. 42

Resettlement equals internment, and the Dept. of Homeland Security sees this as part of their bailiwick.  The point should already be obvious, but the inclusion of DHS–which is exclusively a domestic agency-means that these plans include the United States proper.


Do the MRAP’s and 1.6 billion bullets, and M4’s start to make more sense in that context?

The need for military police and MI personnel to use
incentives for different purposes and at different times. The proper
coordination between military police and MI personnel is necessary so that,
when interrogators promise an approved incentive to a detainee, the military
police ensure that the detainee receives the incentive and is allowed to retain
it. The use of incentives must be coordinated with, and approved by, the
detention facility commander. The provision and withdrawal of incentives may
not affect the baseline standards of humane treatment. For example, military
police may provide incentives such as special food items. When those incentives
are withdrawn, however, military police must still provide the normal rations.
Failure to cooperate in an intelligence interrogation cannot result in disadvantageous treatment. The withdrawal of
incentives provided to similarly situated detainees must be based on
disciplinary reasons or reasons of security, not failure to cooperate with
HUMINT interrogations. 46

Have you seen any POW movie?  Ones where they give chocolate and cigarettes to informers, or to those willing to make propaganda videos?  All they are saying here is that while bribery is good and condoned, that failing to take the bribe won’t get you in solitary for a month.  Fat fucking chance they mean it.  But the policy is there.  No one can deny it.

Government contractors may be used to provide support to U.S. armed
forces. Commanders must fully understand their role in planning for and
managing contractors on the battlefield and ensure that their staffs are
trained to plan for and manage contractor support. 209

 Regular Army and reserve component military personnel
and DOD civilian personnel may serve as contracting officers supporting
deployed forces. 209

They can hire mercenaries, and those decisions can be made by civilian DOD personnel.  Put another way, multiple chains of command can be put in place covertly, and the names manning the guns kept secret, well paid, and willing to handle any and all tasks assigned.  Waffen SS type stuff, for example.

E-1. The DOD, Department of Homeland Security, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, and other federal agencies provide support for I/R operations.
Often, there is more than one federal agency providing support for I/R operations. These federal agencies may
support nongovernment agencies and/or private organizations in their I/R support roles. Page 223

Again, DHS and FEMA play a role, as does the DOD, which has not operated on US soil–at least in any large way–since the  Civil War, according to my recollection.  Disaster relief, and dealing with riots and the likely have always been a matter for the National Guard.  The development of a standing military was rightly feared for most of our history, because they get all the best weapons, and if they are perverted, they can easily conquer the civilian populace, as has happened virtually ubiquitously in history.  Hell, event based history consists in little else.  Our Founder knew that.  We didn’t have a standing military worth mentioning until World War 2.

Other federal agencies can provide advice and
assistance in performing I/R operations. For example, the Department of Transportation has technical
capabilities and expertise in public transportation and the Department of Agriculture has projects and activities
ongoing in foreign countries and can provide technical assistance and expertise upon request. Other
federal agencies that can be resourceful in planning and implementing I/R operations are the U.S. Agency
for International Development, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. Information Agency, Department of Justice,
Public Health Service, and ICE.

Is this getting a bit weirder?  They are saying that, in allegedly foreign operations–they are kind of sort of still trying to keep this facade up–the Department of Transportation can be of assistance.  How?  What do they do?  They oversee the awarding of contracts, and most of their budget lately seems to have come from the “Stimulus”.  Every State has their own DOT, and builds their own highways, albeit typically with matching Federal funds (which is where taxpayers send money to Washington, and they divvy it back out in concordance with where they need votes.) 


One wonders how many bullets the DoT just purchased.


Department of Agriculture?  U.S. Information Agency?

 The Department of Justice agency that the U.S.
armed forces may contact for assistance in domestic humanitarian assistance operations is the Community
Relations Service. Under the authority and direction of the attorney general, the Community Relations
Service provides on-site resolution assistance through a field staff of mediators and negotiators. 225

If I am reading this right, the scope of operations of the US military will be controlled by Eric Holder, who has already shown he is quite willing to countenance mass murder in the pursuit of his political objectives.  I would assume this clause would only apply if Obama Federalizes the various National Guard units, nullifies the Posse Comitatus Act via declaring a state of emergency, takes a direct, dictatorial control of our troops, and they don’t do what he likes.


Throughout this FM they reference military prisoners.  Normally, when we think of military prisoners, we think of the guys who commit rapes, or murders, or go on drunken binges and hit their CO.


But this thing obsesses over command and control.  Will they not have taken into account hordes of soldiers who simply refuse to follow orders, say to pull little old ladies and their grandkids out of their homes at gun point, put them on trucks, and lock them in prisons?  Will they not have put figurative commissars at the back with figurative (and literal) machine guns to punish them if they fail to follow orders?  To the point, will they not be charged with some combination of dereliction of duty and/or treason, depending on the strength of their beliefs?


These prisons are for soldiers who do not obey orders too.


In sum, I would like to say there is a LOT to be worried about.  At the same time, my fundamental belief is that, while weak and stupid as a lot, most Americans do believe in common sense justice, do want to live in freedom, oppose mass murder and mass incarceration, and generally will tend to do the right thing when prompted.


This whole set-up, at least as I see it, depends on three things: 1) a massive shock, such as nuclear detonation (which I have always assumed would be on the Left coast, since the power elite is on the other Left coast); 2) the innate tendency under pressure of our troops and LEO’s to follow orders; and 3) speed.  If they don’t get it done quickly, it unravels quickly, and their treason will stand exposed.


We can’t stop the shock, possibly (although it’s far from clear that the North Koreans have ballistic figured out).  What we can affect is the level of awareness of at least the alert Americans, and in particular the front line of this proposed war on our freedom; we can also affect the speed of the operation, through varying degrees of civil disobedience.


We all die.  From what I read, this is on balance a good thing for most of us.  But while we are here, it is our job–all of us–to feed the good, which in my view ALWAYS starts with the effort to think and see clearly.  My effort at helping me, and you, to do that, is here. 


Please do something useful with it.